The scenario describes a vulnerability where a user can manipulate the order_id parameter in the URL (e.g., https://example.com/?order_id=53870) to access other users' order details, indicating a lack of proper access control. This is a classic case of an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) attack. IDOR occurs when an application exposes a reference to an internal object (e.g., an order ID) that can be manipulated by an unauthorized user to access resources they should not have access to, without validating the user's permissions.

Option A ('Insecure Direct Object Reference'): Correct, as the ability to change order_id to view arbitrary orders fits the definition of IDOR.

Option B ('Session Poisoning'): Incorrect, as session poisoning involves corrupting or altering a user's session data, which is not indicated here.

Option C ('Session Riding OR Cross-Site Request Forgery'): Incorrect, as CSRF involves tricking a user into submitting a request (e.g., via a malicious form), not manipulating a URL parameter directly.

Option D ('Server-Side Request Forgery'): Incorrect, as SSRF involves tricking the server into making unauthorized requests to internal or external resources, which is not the case here.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)' and 'OWASP Top 10 (A04:2021 - Insecure Design).'

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) occurs when an attacker tricks a user's browser into making an unintended request to a site where the user is authenticated, potentially performing actions like changing a password. Let's analyze the request:

The request is a POST to /changepassword with a Cookie: JSESSIONID, indicating the user is authenticated via a session. The Content-Length: 95 and payload (new_password=lov3MyPiano23&confirm_password=lov3MyPiano23) suggest a state-changing operation (password change).

CSRF vulnerability arises when the request lacks a unique, unpredictable token to validate its legitimacy, and the server accepts it based solely on the session cookie. The request includes no CSRF token (e.g., in the body or headers like X-CSRF-Token).

The Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin header indicates the request originates from the same domain, but this is a browser feature and does not guarantee server-side protection against CSRF from a malicious site (e.g., via a hidden iframe or form submission).

Without a CSRF token, an attacker could craft a malicious HTML page with a form that submits this exact request when a victim visits their site while authenticated to example.com, exploiting the browser's automatic inclusion of the JSESSIONID cookie. This is a textbook CSRF vulnerability.

Option A ('True'): Correct, as the request lacks a CSRF token, making it vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Option B ('False'): Incorrect, as the absence of a CSRF token indicates vulnerability.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)' and 'Session Management.'

The screenshot shows an HTTP POST request to /upload.php with a multipart/form-data payload, where the attacker uploads a file named malicious.php disguised as an image/jpeg but containing PHP code (<?php phpinfo(); ?>). This indicates an attempt to exploit a File Upload Vulnerability. Such vulnerabilities occur when an application allows users to upload files without proper validation or sanitization, enabling attackers to upload malicious scripts (e.g., PHP) that can be executed on the server. In this case, if the server executes the uploaded malicious.php, it could expose server information via phpinfo() or perform other malicious actions.

Option A ('HTTP Desync Attack') involves manipulating HTTP request pipelines, which is not relevant here as the request appears standard. Option B ('File Path Traversal Attack') involves accessing unauthorized files using ../, which is not evident in this request. Option D ('Server-Side Request Forgery') involves tricking the server into making unintended requests, which does not apply to file uploads. Thus, C is the correct answer, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'File Handling Security' and 'OWASP Top 10 (A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration).'

A safe password must adhere to security best practices, including sufficient length, complexity, and resistance to common attacks (e.g., brute force, dictionary attacks). Let's evaluate each option:

Option A ('Monday@123'): This password is weak because it combines a common word ('Monday') with a simple number and symbol pattern. It is vulnerable to dictionary attacks and does not meet complexity requirements (e.g., mixed case, special characters, and randomness).

Option B ('abcdef'): This is a sequence of letters with no numbers, special characters, or uppercase letters. It is extremely weak and easily guessable, making it unsafe.

Option C ('Sq0Jh819%ak'): This password is considered safe because it is at least 10 characters long, includes a mix of uppercase letters (S, J, H), lowercase letters (q, h, a, k), numbers (0, 8, 9, 1), and a special character (%). It lacks predictable patterns and meets modern password policy standards (e.g., NIST SP 800-63B recommends at least 8 characters with complexity).

Option D ('1234567890'): This is a simple numeric sequence, highly predictable, and vulnerable to brute-force attacks, making it unsafe.

The correct answer is C, as it aligns with secure password creation guidelines, a key topic in the CAP syllabus under 'Authentication Security' and 'Secure Coding Practices.'

When multiple domain names (e.g., www.ironman.com and www.hulk.com) resolve to the same IP address (e.g., 1.3.3.7), a web server hosting multiple applications on that IP must determine which application to serve. This is achieved using the HTTP 'Host' header, which is part of the HTTP/1.1 protocol. The client (browser) includes the requested domain (e.g., Host: www.ironman.com) in the request, allowing the server to route the request to the appropriate virtual host or application configured for that domain. This is a standard practice in virtual hosting.

Option A ('The web server inspects the HTTP 'Host' header sent by the client'): Correct, as the Host header enables the server to distinguish between applications on the same IP.

Option B ('The web server inspects the cookies sent by the client'): Incorrect, as cookies are used for session management or personalization, not for identifying the requested application.

Option C ('The web server inspects the client's SSL certificate'): Incorrect, as SSL certificates are used for encryption and authentication, not for application routing (though they may include the domain name for validation).

Option D ('The web server uses a reverse DNS lookup of the client's IP address'): Incorrect, as reverse DNS lookup resolves an IP to a domain, which is irrelevant for the server determining the requested application.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Web Server Configuration' and 'HTTP Protocol Security.'