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An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance.
KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.
* X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;
* Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.
KYC PROFILE
Customer Name: AAA International Company. Ltd
Customer ID: 123456
Account Opened: June 2017
Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020
Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017
AML risk level: High
Account opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans, and Trade Finance
Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per
transaction amount
During the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:
TRANSACTION JOURNAL
Review dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021
For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from
different third parties
Outgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to
different third parties
For United States Dollars (USD) currency:
Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from
different third parties
Outgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to
different third parties.
RFI Information and Supporting documents:
According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank
with the information below:
1J All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.
2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank's customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loan
Which additional information would support escalating this account for closure?
A review of outward remittances reveals the same pattern of several simple steps for each transaction, which could indicate a layering scheme to obscure the origin and destination of the funds. This would support escalating this account for closure, as it is inconsistent with the customer's declared purpose and anticipated activities. The other options are not relevant or sufficient to warrant account closure.
During a review, an analyst notices discrepancies between a customer's nature of business listed on the business registry and what was stated on the customers application. The analyst should:
The analyst should clarify discrepancies noted in the customer's declared profile given the downstream impact on the risk assessment. This is because discrepancies between the customer's nature of business and the information on the business registry may indicate that the customer is not operating a legitimate business or is trying to conceal its true activities. The analyst should verify the customer's identity, source of funds, and purpose of transactions to ensure that the customer's risk profile is accurate and consistent with the Fl's risk appetite.
What action does the USA PATRIOT Act allow the US government to take regarding financial institutions (FIs) that are based outside of the US?
According to the CAMS manual 6th edition, the USA PATRIOT Act allows the US government to subpoena documents from foreign financial institutions (FIs) that have no presence in the US (option B). The manual states that 'The USA PATRIOT Act provides US law enforcement agencies with the power to subpoena documents from foreign banks that maintain correspondent accounts with US banks or have no presence in the United States' (p. 77).
A U.S. financial institution (Fl) receives a grand jury subpoena for a corporate client's account. The Fl should:
The Fl should review the corporate account's activity and transactions. This is because a grand jury subpoena is a legal request for information or testimony that may be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution. The Fl should review the account for any suspicious or unusual activity that may be related to the subpoena or indicate money laundering, terrorist financing, or other financial crimes. The Fl should also document its review and retain any relevant records.
Which payment method for purchasing luxury items is a red flag for potential money laundering?
According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the use of large amounts of cash is a common method for money launderers to move illicit funds [1]. Purchasing luxury items with cash can indicate an attempt to convert illegal funds into tangible assets that can be easily resold or moved across borders. As a result, businesses that deal with luxury items are required to implement enhanced due diligence measures, including monitoring transactions involving large amounts of cash [1].